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of the population of Kabul had moved
several times as a direct result of the
conflict. Similarly, monitoring undertak-
en by UNHCR at the main entry points
to the city found a high level of move-
ment back and forth. 
Foremost among those who have left are
professionals working for the govern-
ment administration. With such a signifi-
cant outflow of professionals, agencies
cannot plan on the assumption that
those who are currently working in the
government administration will neces-
sarily remain, or even that their own
staff will stay. Those who are left behind
in Kabul are likely to be among the more
impoverished because those with the
means to leave for Pakistan, Iran or
other parts of Afghanistan have already
done so. This reality has combined with
a deteriorating economic situation with-
in the capital to produce a population
close to destitution.
The dilemmas faced by agencies
In seeking to meet what are significant
humanitarian needs, UN agencies, ICRC
and NGOs have needed to determine
appropriate criteria for their interven-
tions and for their targeting of aid. Early
interventions in the urban sector, such
as those in Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad,
were clearly targeted at the internally
displaced, in direct response to the out-
flows from Kabul following the major
rocketing episodes. Such targeting, how-
ever, is not easily effected. In Mazar, for
example, although a couple of small
camps were established, most of those
displaced disappeared into the wider
population and could not easily be
accessed.
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he issue comes more clearly to
the fore when such power hold-
ers take over urban areas and
therefore have responsibility for the
administrative structures of the state
within those areas. This article considers
how this question has been played out
in the context of Afghanistan. 
The Afghan conflict has tended to be
characterised as one in which people
moved in their millions from the villages
of Afghanistan across the border to the
sanctuary of refugee camps and urban
settlements in Pakistan and Iran.
However, not all those who fled their 
villages in response to Soviet military
action left the country. Many sought
refuge in caves in the mountains and, in
recent years, and certainly since the col-
lapse of the Soviet-backed Government
of Muhammed Najibullah in April 1992,
many more made their way to the urban
centres of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat,
Kandahar and Jalalabad.  
Each successive phase of the conflict
has led to further displacement of the
urban population, both within and
between urban centres, with the result
that one cannot talk in terms of a stable
urban population. It is difficult to know
whether the population of Kabul is nearer
to half a million or a million at any one
time although most of the estimates
given are around the million mark. A
study undertaken by ICRC in December
1996 found that a significant proportion
In many situations worldwide where rebel or
other movements have wrested large areas of
territory from the control of central govern-
ment or, as in the case of Afghanistan, where
the government has collapsed and control is
divided between different power holders,
humanitarian agencies are having to determine
how they should relate to non-governmental
power holders. 
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when 200,000 people were displaced
from the Shomali Valley to Kabul in
early 1997. Humanitarian agencies were
reluctant to make provision for a popu-
lation which had apparently been
forcibly removed from their settlements
as an act of war, lest this encourage fur-
ther such action, and agreement was
reached that ICRC would simply provide
temporary shelter for those who could
not find accommodation with relatives,
in the hope that people would quickly
find their own solutions and return to
the Shomali Valley as soon as possible.
This policy proved to be reasonably
effective and, by the late summer of
1997, about half of those displaced had
returned. There remained the question,
however, as to whether the remaining
100,000 or so should be specifically pro-
vided for and, if so, how, given that
these were absorbed within the popula-
tion. Such targeting was also difficult to
justify when so much of the population
was nearing destitution and when most
had experienced displacement in one
form or another. 
Different agencies dealt with the issue of
establishing criteria and targeting in var-
ious ways. ICRC, with its IDP-specific
mandate, has taken the view that it
should provide for the wider population,
on the assumption that the displaced
would also benefit (with the obvious
exception of the temporary refuge
referred to above). UNHCR, with its
refugee-specific mandate, has sought to
focus on the provision of support to dis-
placed people returning primarily from
Jalalabad to Kabul, to assist them in the
repair of their damaged houses. The
European Commission’s DG1 has opted
to concentrate on the rehabilitation of
the agricultural areas surrounding
Kabul and other urban areas so as to
strengthen the capacity of the agricul-
tural hinterland to receive people
returning from the cities.
Prior to the suspension of ECHO fund-
ing for Kabul in July 1998, most NGOs
in Kabul had been funded by ECHO
which had been providing between
10m and 35m ECU per year since
1995. For them, the question of
whether people had suffered displace-
ment had not been a major issue.
More important had been the question
of how best to provide for a popula-
tion which was nearing destitution in
an economic environment which
offered very few opportunities and
where those opportunities were seri-
ously constrained by the policies of the
power holders, such as the controls
imposed on the employment of women. 
A number of options have been explored
including: large-scale relief programmes
benefiting up to half a million people
but for which the process of drawing up
lists of beneficiaries has inevitably been
problematic; food-for-work; and income-
generating programmes for targeted
individuals (difficult in a collapsed econ-
omy when there is little or no market for
new produce). However, relief distribu-
tions have inevitably ended up being the
primary solution, both in Kabul and
other urban areas.
Dealing with the power holders:
the provision of public services
Agencies have also had a responsibility
to assess whether basic health, water
supply, sanitation and education ser-
vices are available to the urban popula-
tion. This has required evaluation of the
capacity of the governmental and munic-
ipal administration, and also of their
willingness to commit resources to these
services.
In the case of Afghanistan, a number of
major dilemmas have arisen in this con-
text since the advent of the Taliban.
These arose primarily because the
Taliban chose to reduce, as an instru-
ment of policy, the services available to
one section of the population - women.
Women were denied access to education
and faced obstacles in their efforts to
obtain equal health care. Women were
also not permitted to work outside the
health sector and this has made it diffi-
cult for agencies to employ women in
order to gain access to women for the
provision of services. In addition, the
Taliban were entirely focused on the war
effort and wished to commit all their
resources to this objective. Funding for pub-
lic services was not, therefore, a priority.
Agencies therefore faced two further
dilemmas: whether or not to accept
responsibility for the provision of those
public services which were permitted by
the Taliban and also whether to quietly
acquiesce at the denial of equal access
to services or to advocate for a reversal
of Taliban policy. They also had to con-
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sider to what extent their assumption of
such responsibility was strengthening
the power holders or reinforcing their
policies. Among the questions they had
to address were the following:
• Would the power holders be forced
to provide public services on a
greater scale if the agencies with-
drew? If this was unlikely, should the
agencies take the view that humani-
tarian needs dictated that they
remain, regardless?
• Were they engaging in institution-
building? How could this be defined?
If an agency repaired and repainted a
hospital damaged by conflict, was
this institution-building or a neces-
sary step to provide basic health care
in the immediate future to a popula-
tion at risk? If equipment was provid-
ed, did the same argument apply?
Should agencies repair damaged
pipes and water pumps? Were these
essential to immediate public health
needs? Should agencies work in co-
operation with the Ministry of Public
Health, the Municipality and the
Water Supply Department, sitting on
joint committees, in order to plan the
most effective use of resources or
should they operate parallel services?
To what extent was there a relation-
ship between the severity of need of
the population and the question as to
how far agencies should work in con-
junction with the state administra-
tion? Was it easier to take a more
principled position if the severity of
need was less?
• Were steps they took now going to
make the situation worse in the
future? If they supported sponta-
neous home schools for girls now,
would this provide justification for
future policy for girls to be educated
at home? If they helped to repair and
equip a hospital for women, would
this later be used to require women
to only attend this hospital?
• Would advocacy to urge a change in
policy, so that equal access to all ser-
vices might be achieved, have any
impact?
Questions such as these are likely to
arise increasingly in situations such as
Afghanistan where there is no national
government and where blocks of territo-
ry are held by particular military ele-
ments. Agencies have no choice but to
engage with these elements, if only to
ensure the security of their staff and
their operations. However, if a point is
reached where a military force begins to
regard itself as the administrative
authority for the area under its control,
the agency has to reappraise its situa-
tion. It will, no doubt, have to seek per-
mission to continue to operate, involving
complex interaction with the new
authority. The point is reached where
the agency has to decide whether or not
to involve the authority in decisions relat-
ing to the provision of public services.
In a normal situation, where there is an
internationally-recognised government,
this would not be an issue. However, in a
situation where there is no such govern-
ment the agency has to make a very dif-
ficult decision as to whether, in its view,
the new authority is demonstrating a
reasonable level of responsibility in rela-
tion to the provision of services and
should, therefore, be regarded as having
a legitimate right to exercise control
over the provision of those services. 
In so far as it may be providing most of
the resources to provide the services,
the agency potentially has some leverage
to negotiate an arrangement whereby
services are provided on terms which it
finds acceptable. However, with a power
holder such as the Taliban, which does
not attach priority to the provision of
public services and, at the same time,
feels very ambivalent about the presence
of foreigners, there is little or no lever-
age. In Kabul, where funding on a large
scale has been provided and where twen-
ty or more agencies have been operating,
the humanitarian assistance community
has been able to exercise very limited
leverage. In Herat, Kandahar and
Jalalabad, where agencies are only able
to ensure that health and public health
services are provided at a very basic
level, the leverage is even less,
The relationship is inevitably an awk-
ward one. If the target population has
clear humanitarian needs, the agency
will probably deal with the power holder
to the extent that its cooperation is nec-
essary, or conducive, to the most effec-
tive use of resources. This is, however, 
a difficult balancing act: excessive co-
operation may be regarded by the power
holder as implicit recognition of its
authority; minimal cooperation may
undermine service provision and might
also weaken what remains of a govern-
ment administration.
A further issue for agencies with a devel-
opmental mandate, particularly those
within the UN system, is that the govern-
mental structure provides the natural
counterparts for their interventions. This
is less likely to be the case for agencies
with a relief focus. These will look for
whatever structures are likely to be most
effective and, while these could include
government departments or para-statal
bodies such as the Red Crescent, it is
likely that ICRC and NGOs, rather than
government departments, will play the
major role in implementing relief 
programmes.
One of the key arguments for working
with and resourcing the administration
in such situations is that, if a legitimate
government did emerge, it would benefit
from a functioning administration.
Those espousing this view argue that if
agencies chose to work in parallel with
the administration rather than with it,
government staff would almost certainly
be attracted by the higher salaries and
better operating conditions of the agen-
cies and the administration would be
further depleted. 
The outcome in Afghanistan
In practice, in the urban areas of Afgh-
anistan, both UN agencies and NGOs
have worked closely with the Ministry of
Public Health, the Municipalities and the
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Water Supply Departments. They have
taken primary responsibility for the pro-
vision of health and public health ser-
vices but have also provided some
resources to the administrative struc-
tures of the state to enable them to
function more effectively and to play a
contributory role. Thus, for example,
UNCHS (United Nations Centre for
Human Settlements) has provided vehi-
cles to the Municipality to facilitate
waste clearance, NGOs have refurbished
hospital buildings, and incentive pay-
ments have been made to health service
workers to encourage them to give time
to public services rather than work
exclusively in private practice. 
Agencies have thus worked in partner-
ship with the administrative structures
of the state, at times on the basis of con-
tractual relationships in which both par-
ties agreed to provide certain resources.
However, there have been a couple of
examples, of late, where the UN has
entered into contracts with administra-
tive structures of the state, or with
NGOs nominated by the Taliban, to take
full responsibility for the provision of
particular services (such as vaccination
programmes in particular regions or
aspects of urban-based relief pro-
grammes). This new development in the
relationship between the UN and the
Taliban has encouraged the Taliban to
regard NGOs as competitors for external
resources and to think that, if NGOs
were removed, the UN would enter into
further contracts with the administrative
structures of the state or Taliban-nomi-
nated NGOs. This would appear to have
been one factor in the negotiations
which took place between the Taliban
and NGOs in July 1998, which resulted
in the expulsion of NGOs from Kabul. 
However, this ambivalence towards
NGOs does not only relate to their posi-
tion as potential competitors. Western
NGOs have also been regarded with sus-
picion because of the risk that they
might undermine the efforts of the
Taliban to achieve a spiritual cleansing
of the country. Isolated incidents of cul-
turally inappropriate behaviour on the
part of aid workers have tended to rein-
force this perspective. Further, the
Taliban have viewed the multiplicity of
NGOs with concern and have felt uneasy
at the very limited control which they
have had over their activities in a situa-
tion in which they have been aiming to
impose strict controls on the behaviour
of the population. They have thus
sought to bring NGOs under tight rein. 
In addition, NGOs have been seen as
potentially sympathetic to opposition
elements, by virtue of their historical
links or because particular Afghan mem-
bers of staff are thought to have certain
sympathies or links. The fact that cer-
tain NGOs have worked in active support
of governmental structures in the past,
while the Mujahidin Government was in
power, and are now equivocal in their
support for the same with the Taliban in
control, is a further factor.
This relationship has been played out in
a situation where poverty is acute and
where public health problems have
placed large numbers of people at risk.
At times, the complexities arising from
the relationship have left donor govern-
ments, UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs
effectively powerless to meet the needs
of the population.
The current situation in the urban cen-
tres of Afghanistan is likely to be repro-
duced within urban centres held by
non-governmental power holders else-
where in the world, particularly if there
is a civil war situation. It is far from
clear whether the international commu-
nity has got to grips with how it should
most appropriately work in such situa-
tions.
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Iran: a challenge
for NGOs
Iran has one of the largest refugee popu-
lations in the world, including one and a
half million Afghans, half a million Iraqis
and a quarter of a million Kurds. Only 5
per cent of the refugees in Iran live in
camps and little is known outside Iran of
the realities behind the figures.  
The International Consortium for Refug-
ees in Iran (ICRI), founded in 1992, 
raises awareness of the problems facing
refugees in Iran and gives practical assis-
tance to NGOs interested in working here.
ICRI is a consortium of European NGOs
whose members support the development
of NGO work with refugees in Iran. Not
all have programmes in Iran.
Past obstacles to international NGO
(INGO) work in Iran included the conflict-
ing currents of policy regarding INGOs
within the Government of the Islamic
Republic and the virtual international boy-
cott on funding for projects in Iran.
However, neither of these obstacles now
seems as intractable as they once were.
The election of President Khatami in
August 1997 heralded a new approach
to ‘civic organisations’ and, although
INGOs still cannot formally register in
Iran, they can open bank accounts and
establish offices there. European govern-
ments are also more willing to consider
funding projects in this new climate. 
There are currently only three INGOs
working in Iran: MSF (France), Global
Partners and Ockenden Venture.
However, there is a thriving group of
about 15 Iraqi, Afghan and Iranian
NGOs implementing projects in Iran and
in some cases working in partnership with
the INGOs. ICRI acts as a coordinating
body, sharing information on 
programme plans and refugee needs and
holding regular meetings.
ICRI is housed in the UNHCR office in
Teheran. For newcomers to Iran, one of its
most useful services is guiding NGOs
through the maze of official regulations
and policies and providing practical
advice and logistical support. ICRI’s
monthly reports and regular in-depth
studies of refugee conditions provide use-
ful material for NGOs planning 
assistance. ICRI also has a wide network
of local contacts in various Ministries, 
local NGOs and UN agencies. 
Contact ICRI by phone or fax: +98 21
877 5464 or email: squire@unhcr.ch
Catherine Squire
ICRI Representative